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THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT’S SIDE EFFECTS:
PRECAUTIONS FOR BIOSIMILARS
Anna B. Laakmann
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984 (generally known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, or “HatchWaxman”) was designed to expedite regulatory approval of generic
drugs while simultaneously preserving incentives for innovators to
invest in the research and development of new drugs. While HatchWaxman has undoubtedly achieved its aim of creating a robust generic
pharmaceuticals market, it has also produced several unanticipated
consequences. Its changes to the federal regulatory scheme have
yielded convoluted products liability rules, upsetting the conventional
notion that the seller of a defective product is liable for harm caused by
its intended use. In addition, its modifications to patent law have had
the perverse effects of propagating patents of questionable value and
encouraging potentially anti-competitive agreements between generic
and brand name manufacturers.
Hatch-Waxman’s emergent repercussions are particularly salient
in light of the recent passage of the Biologics Price Competition and
Innovation Act (BPCIA). The BPCIA, enacted as part of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, crafted a compromise
between pioneer and follow-on biologics manufacturers patterned after
Hatch-Waxman’s regulatory scheme for pharmaceuticals. This Article
reviews Hatch-Waxman unintended effects, and suggests that they
should serve as precautionary guideposts for implementation of the
BPCIA. The FDA and lawmakers should heed these potential pitfalls
and proactively confront unavoidable tradeoffs between safety, cost,
and access to therapeutic biologics.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984 (generally known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, or “HatchWaxman”) structured a compromise between brand name and
generic pharmaceutical manufacturers.1 The legislative goal was to
expedite the approval of generic drugs while simultaneously
preserving sufficient incentives for innovators to invest in the
research and development of new drugs.2 Hatch-Waxman made
several changes to patent law and the federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA). It authorized patent term extensions for
innovative drugs to compensate for patent life lost during premarket
review by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)3 and created
FDA-administered exclusivities for new products and indications.4
Hatch-Waxman also established an abbreviated new drug application
(ANDA) pathway under which generic manufacturers may rely on
FDA findings of safety and efficacy for brand name equivalents and
avoid the expensive process of producing their own clinical trials
data.5 In addition, it exempted from patent infringement the use of
patented inventions for research intended to generate information for
ANDA submission.6 Finally, it created a complex scheme whereby
generic manufacturers can challenge the validity and scope of brand
name manufacturers’ patents prior to bringing generic versions to
market.7
Generic drug utilization has dramatically increased since
1. Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 101, 98 Stat. 1538, 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§ 156 (2012)).
2. Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“The Act emerged from
Congress’s efforts to balance two conflicting policy objectives: to induce brand name
pharmaceutical firms to make the investments necessary to research and develop new drug
products, while simultaneously enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of these
drugs to market.”).
3. 35 U.S.C. § 156(c) (2006) (patent life is extended by a “time equal to the regulatory
review period for the approved product”); see id. § 156(g)(6)(A) (capping the extension at five
years).
4. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2006) (five years of data exclusivity for FDA-approved new
chemical entities (NCEs); Id. § 355(j)(5)(F)(iii) (three years of data exclusivity for FDA-approved
new indications requiring submission of clinical data).
5. Id. § 355(j).
6. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
7. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B).
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Hatch-Waxman’s enactment. In 2012, generics accounted for 84
percent of all U.S. prescriptions,8 compared to only 19 percent in
1984.9 This growth has stemmed in part from Hatch-Waxman’s
incentives for generic manufacturers to assert that brand name
patents are either invalid or not infringed by generic versions.10 The
passage in all fifty states of generic substitution laws, which enable
pharmacists to fill prescriptions for brand name drugs with their
generic copies, has further fueled widespread generic adoption.11
While Hatch-Waxman has undoubtedly achieved its aim of
producing a robust generic pharmaceuticals market, it has also
created several unanticipated consequences. Its modifications to the
federal regulatory scheme have produced convoluted products
liability rules, upsetting the conventional notion that the seller of a
defective product is liable for harm caused by its intended use.12
Additionally, its provisions that are designed to encourage generic
manufacturers to challenge unexpired patents have had the perverse
effects of propagating patents of questionable value and encouraging
potentially anti-competitive agreements between generic and brand
name manufacturers.13
Hatch-Waxman’s emergent repercussions are particularly salient
in light of the recent passage of the Biologics Price Competition and
Innovation Act (BPCIA). The BPCIA, enacted as part of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, crafted a compromise
between pioneer and follow-on biologics manufacturers patterned
after Hatch-Waxman’s regulatory scheme for pharmaceuticals.14
8. Elizabeth Richardson, Health Policy Brief: Biosimilars, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Oct. 10,
2013, at 2, available at http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=100.
9. Henry Grabowski et al., Implementation of the Biosimilar Pathway: Economic and
Policy Issues, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 511, 537 (2011).
10. C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug Patents?, 8
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 613, 614 (2011) (“[T]he prevalence of challenges has risen
dramatically over the past 25 years, placing them at the center of a vigorous debate about drug
innovation and access.”); C. Scott Hemphill, Paying For Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent
Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1567 (2006) (noting that
nine of the ten best-selling drugs in 2000 attracted pre-expiration patent challenges).
11. Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 2014 WL 4055813, at *16 (Ala. Aug. 15, 2014).
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra Parts III.A and III.B.
14. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 7001–03,
124 Stat. 119, 804–21 (2010) [hereinafter BPCIA]. Biologics are animal-based large molecules
typically regulated under the Public Service Act, which contained no provision for an abbreviated
approval pathway prior to passage of the BPCIA. See 42 U.S.C.A § 262 (2012); Grabowski et al.,
supra note 9, at 512–17.
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This Article highlights the policy problems spawned by
Hatch-Waxman and anticipates the challenges that lie ahead with the
advent of biosimilars.15
II. PATIENT SAFETY CONCERNS
A. Bioequivalence and Generic Substitution
In order to use Hatch-Waxman’s ANDA pathway, a generic
drug manufacturer must show that its product contains the same
active ingredient(s) as the brand name drug; has the same route of
administration, dosage form, and strength; and is “bioequivalent.”16
Bioequivalence is established by showing that the rate and extent of
absorption of the generic drug into the patient’s bloodstream is
within 80 percent to 125 percent of that of the brand name drug.17 If
a generic drug is “therapeutically equivalent” to its brand name
counterpart, states may permit pharmacists to substitute the generic
for the brand name drug without authorization from the prescribing
physician.18 Therapeutic equivalents “can be expected to have the
same clinical effect and safety profile when administered to patients
under the conditions specified in the labeling.”19 All fifty states have
enacted laws that either allow or mandate generic substitution.20
Pharmacies are encouraged to substitute generics for brand name
drugs, since they commonly receive higher dispensing fees for

15. A “biosimilar” is a biologic molecule that closely resembles a biologic product that has
already been approved by the FDA. The BPCIA authorizes the FDA to approve a biosimilar
through a streamlined process if there are “no clinically meaningful differences . . . in terms of
safety, purity, and potency” between the reference product and the biosimilar. 42 U.S.C.
§262(i)(2). See infra Part IV.A.
16. Janet Freilich, The Paradox of Legal Equivalents and Scientific Equivalence:
Reconciling Patent Law’s Doctrine of Equivalents with the FDA’s Bioequivalence Requirement,
66 SMU L. REV. 59, 70 (2013).
17. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: BIOAVAILABILITY AND
BIOEQUIVALENCE STUDIES FOR ORALLY ADMINISTERED DRUG PRODUCTS—GENERIC
CONSIDERATIONS 20 (2003), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/.../Guidances
/ucm070124.pdf.
18. Grabowski et al., supra note 9, at 524.
19. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC
EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS vii (2012) [hereinafter Orange Book], available at
http://www.fda.gov/ucm/groups/fdagov-public/@fdagov-drugs-gen/documents/document
/ucm071436.pdf.
20. David R. Holmes et al., American College of Cardiology Foundation and American
Heart Association 2011 Health Policy Statement on Therapeutic Interchange and Substitution, 58
J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 1287, 1305–07 (2011).
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selling generics than for selling brand name equivalents.21
Although this practice helps to reduce healthcare costs, it also
raises safety concerns.22 Contrary to popular perception, generic
drugs are rarely identical to their brand name counterparts.23
Generics must contain the same active ingredients as brand name
drugs, but the FDA permits generic companies to use different
inactive ingredients.24 “High variability” drugs have absorption rates
that differ considerably from patient to patient, and small differences
in the formulations of generic and brand name versions may yield
clinically significant effects.25 Generic substitution can pose safety
hazards even in cases that do not involve high variability drugs. For
example, case evidence suggests that some patients with epilepsy
suffer more frequent seizures following substitution of brand name
antiepileptic agents with generic versions.26 Concerns that switching
between pioneer and generic equivalents could adversely affect
patients have led some states to exempt certain classes of drugs from
state substitution laws.27
B. Labeling Requirements and the Duty to Warn
Hatch-Waxman’s expedited approval pathway has created
thorny regulatory and tort issues with regard to dangers that are
discovered after generic versions of a brand name drug have entered
21. HENRY GRABOWSKI, COMPETITION BETWEEN GENERIC AND BRANDED DRUGS,
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: INCENTIVES, COMPETITION, AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 153, 156 (Frank A. Sloan & Chee-Ruey Hsieh eds., 2007).
22. See Peter Meredith, Bioequivalence and Other Unresolved Issues in Generic Drug
Substitution, 25 CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 2875, 2875–76 (2003).
23. Freilich, supra note 16, at 61; Melinda Beck, Inexact Copies: How Generics Differ from
Brand Names, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2008, at D1 (reporting that an FDA review found that
generic Wellbutrin XL reached its maximum blood concentration in about half the time as the
brand name version, but dismissing this difference as clinically insignificant).
24. Freilich, supra note 16, at 81.
25. Id. at 72 (noting that the pharmacokinetic parameters of generic and brand name “high
variability” drugs may differ by more than 10 percent).
26. M.J. Berg et al., Generic Substitution in the Treatment of Epilepsy: Case Evidence of
Breakthrough Seizures, 71 NEUROLOGY 525, 525–30 (2008). See also R. Talati et al., Efficacy
and Safety of Innovator Versus Generic Drugs in Patients With Epilepsy: A Systematic Review,
32 PHARMACOTHERAPY 314 (2012) (concluding, based on limited data, that innovator and
generic antiepileptic agents are equally safe and effective, but that switching from one version to
the other may be associated with more hospitalizations and longer hospital stays).
27. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 15 So. 3d 642, 645–46, 656–57 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Jonathan D. Rockoff, Cost of Medicine Could Increase: Brand-Name
Drugmakers Target Generic Prescriptions, BALT. SUN, June 17, 2008, at 1A (noting recent laws
passed in Tennessee and Utah that prohibit the substitution of antiepileptic agents).
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the market. FDA approval is not a guarantee of safety and efficacy,
as risks frequently are identified only after widespread use in the
general patient population.28 To bolster patient safety, the FDA
mandates post-market surveillance and compels manufacturers to
establish risk mitigation and evaluation strategies.29 The agency may
require drug sponsors to perform additional clinical studies in order
to investigate risks that are discovered after FDA approval.30 It also
may prescribe labeling changes if it becomes aware of new
information that must be included in the product’s labeling.31
FDA labeling regulations impose different post-market
obligations on brand name and generic manufacturers. These
differences proved crucial in a series of Supreme Court decisions
considering the preemptive effects of federal regulatory law on state
tort claims alleging that drug manufacturers inadequately warned of
risks that arose after market approval. In 2009, the Court held in
Wyeth v. Levine32 that federal law did not preempt a claim against a
brand name drug manufacturer asserting that the label contained an
inadequate warning about the risks of a particular method of
administration.33 The Court reasoned that because manufacturers do
not need FDA preapproval to strengthen the warnings on their labels,
and there was no evidence that the FDA would have prohibited
Wyeth from making such a labeling change, it was not impossible for
Wyeth to satisfy both federal regulatory and state tort duties.34
But two years later, in PLIVA v. Mensing,35 the Court held that
federal law did preempt a failure-to-warn claim against a generic
drug manufacturer.36 The Court explained that the FDA requires that
a generic drug’s warning always be the same as that on the label of
its brand name reference product; therefore, a generic manufacturer
28. Anna B. Laakmann, Collapsing the Distinction Between Experimentation and Treatment
in the Regulation of New Drugs, 62 ALA L. REV. 305, 327–29 (2011); Lars Noah, Informed
Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. &
MED. 361, 394 (2002) (“The issuance of a product license does not magically transform an
investigational medical technology into one that has matured fully and requires no additional
scrutiny.”).
29. 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(1)–(2) (2012).
30. Id. § 355(o)(3).
31. Id. § 355(o)(4).
32. 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 570–73.
35. 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011).
36. Id.
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would violate federal law if it unilaterally made changes to
strengthen its warning.37 Thus, unlike brand name manufacturers, it
would be impossible for generic manufacturers to comply with both
federal sameness requirements and state tort duties mandating
warnings that are stronger than those listed in the FDA-approved
generic label.38
In 2013, the Supreme Court extended the scope of generic
manufacturers’ protection from tort liability by holding that federal
law also preempted claims that generic drugs were defectively
designed.39 The Court reasoned that federal regulations forbade a
generic manufacturer both from changing the chemical composition
of its drug’s active ingredients and from independently revising its
warning label; therefore, impossibility preemption applied.40 The
Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the generic manufacturer
could have complied with both federal regulatory and state tort law
by simply withdrawing its product from the market.41
Can patients who are harmed by generic drugs sue the
manufacturer of the brand name reference product? The majority of
courts that have grappled with this question have adopted the Fourth
Circuit’s reasoning in Foster v. American Home Products Corp.42 to
conclude that they cannot.43 In Foster, the plaintiffs’ daughter died
after taking a generic form of the brand name drug Phenergan.44
They sued the manufacturer of Phenergan, asserting negligent
misrepresentation and strict liability.45 The federal district court
dismissed the strict liability claim because the brand name firm had
not manufactured the product that had allegedly caused the injury.46
The district court allowed the negligence claim to proceed, but the
Fourth Circuit reversed this decision.47 Applying Maryland law, the
appeals court reasoned that the brand name manufacturer did not owe
37. Id. at 2574–75.
38. Id. at 2577–78.
39. Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).
40. Id. at 2473–77.
41. Id. at 2478 (rejecting the First Circuit’s “stop-selling rationale” for why impossibility
preemption should not apply).
42. Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 1994).
43. Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 613 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting that the
“overwhelming majority” of courts considering the issue have followed Foster).
44. Foster, 29 F.3d at 166.
45. Id. at 167.
46. Id. at 166–67.
47. Id. at 171–72.
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a duty to the user of a generic version of its drug, even if it was
foreseeable to the brand name manufacturer that statements
contained in its label could result in injury to the generic user.48
Conte v. Wyeth49 is a notable exception to the prevailing view
that a person who is harmed by a generic drug cannot assert a
negligent misrepresentation claim against the brand name
manufacturer.50 The California Court of Appeals reasoned that brand
name firms owe a duty to all persons whose physicians foreseeably
rely on the information contained in their product labels, including
those who take generic versions of the prescribed drug.51 Citing FDA
bioequivalence requirements and state substitution laws, the court
concluded that it was foreseeable as a matter of law that a
prescription for a generic version of Wyeth’s drug Reglan would be
filled in reliance on the information disclosed in Reglan’s label.52
The court rejected Wyeth’s argument that it is unfair to hold brand
name manufacturers liable for injuries caused by their generic
competitors’ drugs, given that innovators bear the costly burden of
generating information for FDA approval “while generic
manufacturers merely ‘rid[e their] coattails.’”53
Although Conte represents the minority view,54 the Supreme
Court’s recent preemption jurisprudence might compel more courts
to entertain negligent misrepresentation claims against brand name
manufacturers for harms caused by generic drugs. Since compliance
with FDA sameness requirements essentially immunizes generic
48. Id. at 171.
49. 168 Cal. App. 4th 89 (2008).
50. Id. at 94–95.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 105 (“In California, as in most states, pharmacists have long been authorized by
statute to fill prescriptions for name-brand drugs with their generic equivalents unless the
prescribing physician expressly forbids such a substitution . . . . [I]t is also eminently foreseeable
that a physician might prescribe generic metoclopramide in reliance on Wyeth’s representations
about Reglan.”).
53. Id. at 109.
54. Two other courts have followed Conte. See Kellogg v. Wyeth, 762 F. Supp. 2d 694 (D.
Vt. 2010) (holding that a brand name manufacturer had a duty to use due care in disseminating
information about its drug and that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the
plaintiff’s physicians relied upon information provided by the brand name manufacturer when
they prescribed generic versions of the drug); Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 2014 WL 4055813, at *16
(Ala. Aug. 15, 2014) (rejecting Foster’s holding that a plaintiff harmed by a generic drug is
barred from asserting a tort claim against the brand name manufacturer and noting that “[t]he
Foster court’s finding that manufacturers of generic drugs are responsible for the representations
they make in their labeling regarding their products is flawed based on the ‘sameness’
requirement discussed in PLIVA”).
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manufacturers from tort liability,55 the brand name manufacturer may
be the only possible defendant that can be sued by a patient harmed
by a generic drug. Courts that wish to ensure that such plaintiffs have
a viable avenue of relief might be inclined to adopt Conte’s view of
innovator liability. Such an approach would advance compensatory
goals, but could further dampen the incentives to create new drugs
and thus reduce overall patient welfare.
In November 2013, the FDA proposed a rule that would mitigate
the differential impact of the Supreme Court’s preemption
jurisprudence on tort claims against brand name and generic
manufacturers.56 The proposed rule would permit ANDA holders,
like brand name manufacturers, to change their labels in response to
new risk information without obtaining FDA preapproval.57
Impossibility preemption presumably would no longer apply to
claims against generic manufacturers if the FDA were to authorize
generic firms to unilaterally update their labels in response to newly
discovered harms. But the patient protection and victim
compensation objectives furthered by such changes would come at a
steep price. Generic manufacturers are able to offer low-cost drugs
precisely because they are not obligated to generate, aggregate, and
analyze safety and efficacy data about their products, as innovators
are required to do.58 If federal regulations and tort law were to
change in ways that compel generic manufacturers to do more in the
post-market phase, the cost to sell generic pharmaceuticals would
increase and drug prices would correspondingly rise. Moreover, the
benefits of uniformity might be lost if the warnings on generic labels

55. Generic manufacturers may still be held liable for failing to timely update their drug
labels in response to labeling changes made by the brand name reference product sponsor. See,
e.g., In re Fosamax Products Liab. Litig., 965 F. Supp. 2d 413, 416–19 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding
that “failure to update” claims against the Generic Defendants were not preempted).
56. See Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes For Approved Drugs and
Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67985-02 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pt. 314 and 601).
57. Id. See also Katie Thomas, Label Updates May Be Allowed For Generics, N.Y TIMES,
Nov. 8, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/09/business/fda-proposes-letting-generic-drugcompanies-alter-labels.html?_r=0 (including a statement by a representative of the trade group for
the generics industry questioning whether the FDA has statutory authority to promulgate this
regulation).
58. Emily Michiko Morris, The Myth of Generic Pharmaceutical Competition Under the
Hatch-Waxman Act, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 245, 266, 281 (2011)
(noting that, unlike generic manufacturers, brand name manufacturers provide education, safety
and efficacy data, and other social benefits).
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were no longer required at all times to be identical to those of brand
name drugs. Variations in the warning labels for brand name and
generic versions of a drug would undermine the concept of a truly
generic market. This could hamper the operation of state substitution
laws, create patient and prescriber confusion, and exacerbate safety
concerns.
III. PATENT COMPLICATIONS
A. Evergreening and Inventing Around
Manufacturers of new chemical entities (NCEs) list the patents
covering their products in an FDA compendium commonly known as
the Orange Book.59 Generic manufacturers filing ANDAs must
certify either: (i) that the NCE they wish to imitate is not covered by
a patent; (ii) that any such listed patents have expired; (iii) that any
such listed patents will have expired by the time the generic plans to
enter the market; or (iv) that any such listed patents are invalid, not
infringed by the generic product, or both.60 These elections, known
as paragraph I, II, III, and IV certifications respectively, give both
the FDA and the brand name manufacturer notice of the ANDA
applicant’s intent.61 The first ANDA applicant to file a paragraph IV
certification is eligible to receive 180 days of market exclusivity as
the only generic manufacturer of the reference drug.62
In patent infringement cases that arise from a paragraph IV
certification, courts must consider the legal relevance of the generic
manufacturer’s assertion to the FDA that its product is bioequivalent
to the brand name version. In Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc.,63
the Federal Circuit explained that bioequivalency and patent
infringement are two distinct concepts. While bioequivalency is a
medical and regulatory matter for the FDA, patent infringement is a
legal issue that turns on comparative analysis of the claim elements
and the accused product.64 The upshot is that a generic drug can be
59. Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 10, at 618.
60. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2006).
61. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug
Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 189–90 (1999).
62. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006).
63. 566 F.3d 1282, 1296–98 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
64. Id. at 1298 (“Bioequivalency is a regulatory and medical concern aimed at establishing
that two compounds are effectively the same for pharmaceutical purposes. In contrast,
equivalency for purposes of patent infringement requires an element-by-element comparison of
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bioequivalent but not infringing. This means that some generic drugs
can enter the market prior to the expiration of a valid patent covering
a brand name drug.65
Patentees who sue generic manufacturers must show either
literal infringement or infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
(DOE).66 Literal infringement requires a showing that the accused
product incorporates each and every element of the patent claim.67
Absent literal infringement, patentees may successfully establish
infringement under the DOE if the accused product “performs the
same function, in substantially the same way, to achieve substantially
the same result” as the patented invention.68 Equivalence must be
assessed on an element-by-element basis, rather than by comparing
the claimed invention and the accused product holistically.69 This
element-by-element approach aims to preserve claims’ boundarydefining function and to avoid unduly enlarging the scope of the
patent.70
Hatch-Waxman’s patent provisions have engendered a complex
game of cat and mouse between pioneer and generic manufacturers.
Generic versions of brand name drugs may enter the market when
patents covering the reference product’s active ingredients expire or
are invalidated.71 But pioneer firms typically develop patent
portfolios for their commercial products that cover more than the
active ingredients.72 Through a process known as “evergreening,”
brand name manufacturers obtain secondary patents on incremental
improvements to their products and then add those patents to the
Orange Book listing for their licensed drugs.73 In addition to core

the patent claim and the accused product, requiring not only equivalent function but also
equivalent way and result.”).
65. See id. (“‘If bioequivalency meant per se infringement, no alternative to a patented
medicine could ever be offered to the public during the life of a patent.’” (quoting Abbott Labs. v.
Sandoz, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 767, 776 (N.D.Ill.2007))).
66. Harry Surden, Efficient Uncertainty in Patent Interpretation, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1737, 1762–63 (2011).
67. Id. at 1773–74.
68. Dawn Equip. Co. v. Ky. Farms Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1016 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
69. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997).
70. See Surden, supra note 66, at 1773–74.
71. Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching the Limits of Intellectual Property Rights: Has the
Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far?, 41 IDEA 227, 231–32 (2001).
72. Gideon Parchomovksy & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5–6,
16–17 (2005).
73. Freilich, supra note 16, at 104.
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patents covering the active ingredients, brand name manufacturers
retain peripheral patents covering purity, stability, formulation,
chemical synthesis, and methods of use.74 The number of sequential
pharmaceutical patents has skyrocketed since the passage of HatchWaxman.75 This reflects a strategic response by brand name
manufacturers to counteract the effects of robust generic competition
resulting from its enactment.
In order to avoid these weaker follow-on patents, generic
companies frequently seek to introduce products that differ slightly
from the brand name versions.76 Patent infringement cases involving
peripheral patents often turn on whether the generic manufacturer
has distinguished its product enough to avoid infringement under the
DOE.77 ANDA applicants are thus motivated to modify their
products as much as they can without running afoul of the FDA’s
sameness requirements.78 Contrary to their depiction as copycats that
simply manufacture identical versions of brand name drugs and sell
them at lower prices, generic manufacturers are thus encouraged by
an amalgam of regulatory and patent hurdles to engage in their own
forms of innovation.79 While such innovation by generic
manufacturers can yield social benefits, it also exacerbates patient
safety concerns.80 For example, generic manufacturers might
deliberately increase levels of impurities in their products in order to
avoid infringement.81 Since safety is not a relevant consideration in
patent infringement cases, generic manufacturers have perverse
74. Id. at 103.
75. Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 10, at 619–20.
76. Freilich, supra note 16, at 61–62.
77. See id. at 103 (explaining that DOE cases typically involve peripheral patents, as core
patents frequently expire before the brand name drug gets to market).
78. Id. at 80 (noting that this set of incentives creates a paradox whereby “patent law
requires generic companies to innovate a certain distance from the bounds of the patent, but FDA
regulations require generic companies to remain close to the brand name product”).
79. Id. at 107.
80. The safety of generic pharmaceuticals is a particular concern in light of the Supreme
Court’s decisions in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2569 (2011) (holding that
failure-to-warn claims against generic manufacturers under state tort law were preempted by
federal labeling regulations) and Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466,
2470 (2013) (holding that design defect claims against generic manufacturers under state tort law
were preempted by federal law).
81. E.g., Sunovion Pharm., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 731 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2013);
Pozen Inc. v. Par Pharm. Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d 789, 809–12 (E.D. Tex. 2011); see also EKR
Therapeutics, Inc. v. Sun Pharm. Indus., 633 F. Supp. 2d 187 (D.N.J. 2009) (offering another
example of harm that may result when generics deliberately manufacture drugs that differ from
their brand name counterparts).
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incentives to expose patients to unnecessary risks.82
B. Pay-for-Delay Settlements
Hatch-Waxman created an incentive for generic manufacturers
to challenge unexpired drug patents by authorizing 180 days of
exclusivity for the first ANDA applicant to file a paragraph IV
certification.83 This 180-day period could be worth several hundred
million dollars to an ANDA applicant that successfully challenges
patents covering the reference product.84 The FDA may not approve
any other generic version of the innovator’s drug until the exclusivity
period expires. Since the first paragraph IV filer would be the only
generic manufacturer of the drug during this time, it can expect to
share duopoly profits with the brand name firm.85 Importantly, only
the first generic firm to file a paragraph IV certification is entitled to
receive this lucrative bounty.86 If multiple generic manufacturers file
on the same day, they are entitled to share the exclusivity period.87
Brand name manufacturers have adapted to this regulatory
scheme by negotiating “pay-for-delay” settlements with paragraph
IV filers. Under the terms of these settlements, the generic firm
concedes the validity of the innovator’s patents and agrees not to
market a competing drug. In exchange, the brand name manufacturer
pays the generic firm cash or other consideration.88
While such deals are presumably optimal for the settling parties,
they can produce negative externalities by undermining HatchWaxman’s pro-competition objectives. When the first paragraph IV
filer takes litigation to completion and successfully invalidates the
innovator’s patent, it opens the door to robust generic competition

82. Freilich, supra note 16, at 109–10 (“It would be better to craft laws that avoid giving
generic companies perverse incentives to make products less safe.”).
83. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012).
84. Hemphill, supra note 10, at 1579.
85. Id. at 1590.
86. Id. at 1560; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(iii) (stating that upon the first ANDA
applicant’s forfeiture, no other applicants are eligible for the exclusivity period).
87. F.T.C. v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2246 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing amicus
brief stating that the yearly average number of first-day generic applications between 2002 and
2008 never dropped below three).
88. See, e.g., id. at 2229 (majority opinion) (explaining the terms of a pay-for-delay
settlement whereby the manufacturer of name brand AndroGel paid several million dollars to
paragraph IV filers in exchange for their agreement to refrain from bringing generic versions to
market).
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upon expiration of the 180-day exclusivity period.89 Settlement
short-circuits this process. If the first paragraph IV filer refrains from
challenging the innovator’s patents in exchange for cash or in-kind
compensation, other generic manufacturers (who are not eligible for
generic exclusivity) might elect to wait until patent expiration before
filing their own ANDAs. Pay-for-delay settlements thereby reduce
consumer surplus by extending the period during which the
innovator enjoys freedom from competition and associated
monopoly prices.90
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has long insisted that
such reverse payment settlement agreements violate antitrust law and
has challenged numerous agreements as unreasonable restraints of
trade.91 Noting that courts have differed in their application of the
antitrust laws to Hatch-Waxman-related patent settlements, the
Supreme Court recently considered the issue in Federal Trade
Commission v. Actavis, Inc.92 The Court declined to set a categorical
rule that such agreements are presumptively unlawful, but held that
the FTC should have the opportunity to challenge pay-for-delay
agreements on a case-by-case basis under the “rule of reason.”93 It
reasoned that such settlements are an unintended by-product of
“Hatch-Waxman’s unique regulatory framework”94 and run counter
to the statute’s sponsors’ policy goals.95
The ramifications of the Supreme Court’s Actavis decision are
unclear. On one hand, increased FTC scrutiny of reverse payment
settlements could benefit consumers by spurring generic
89. See Hemphill, supra note 10, at 1567.
90. Id. at 1572–73 (noting that economic modeling shows that consumer welfare is reduced,
on average, if the paragraph IV filer enters into a pay-for-delay settlement rather than seeing
patent litigation to completion).
91. Duff Wilson, F.T.C. Criticizes Agreements That Delay Generic Drugs, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 1, 2011, at B2; see also Editorial, The “Pay for Delay” Rap, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2010, at
A22 (stating that FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz “has been conducting his campaign with
evangelical zeal”).
92. 133 S. Ct. at 2230 (2013) (observing that some lower courts found such settlements to be
presumptively lawful while others had found them to be presumptively unlawful).
93. Id. at 2236–37.
94. Id. at 2235.
95. Id. at 2234 (citing 148 Cong. Rec. 14437 (2002); 146 Cong. Rec. 144 (2000)
(“([R]emarks of Sen. Hatch) (‘It was and is very clear that the [Hatch-Waxman Act] was not
designed to allow deals between brand and generic companies to delay competition’) . . .
(remarks of Rep. Waxman) (introducing bill to deter companies from ‘strik[ing] collusive
agreements to trade multimillion dollar payoffs by the brand company for delays in the
introduction of lower cost, generic alternatives’).”)).
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manufacturers to pursue patent challenges rather than agreeing to
delay market entry.96 On the other hand, greater FTC oversight might
discourage ANDA applicants from filing paragraph IV challenges in
the first place, which could have the overall effect of extending the
life of brand name manufacturers’ patent protection.97 In any event,
antitrust litigation will be one of Hatch-Waxman’s lingering side
effects for the indefinite future.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BIOLOGICS
PRICE COMPETITION AND INNOVATION ACT
The BPCIA created an abbreviated approval pathway for
follow-on biologics modeled after Hatch-Waxman’s scheme for
generic drugs. The statute authorizes the FDA to approve a
biosimilar upon expiration of a twelve-year data exclusivity period
for the corresponding pioneer biologic.98 The biosimilar applicant
may rely on the FDA’s prior approval of the pioneer’s biologic if
there are “no clinically meaningful differences . . . in terms of safety,
purity, and potency” between the pioneer’s reference product and the
biosimilar.99 If the FDA finds that a biosimilar is sufficiently similar
to be “interchangeable” with the reference product, the biosimilar
may be substituted for the reference product without the intervention
of the prescribing health care provider.100 The first biosimilar found
to be interchangeable is entitled to an exclusive marketing period
during which no other product may be deemed interchangeable with
the same reference product.101 The BPCIA also contains a complex
96. See id. (“Continued litigation, if it results in patent invalidation or a finding of
noninfringement, could cost the patentee $500 million in lost revenues, a sum that then would
flow in large part to consumers in the form of lower prices.”).
97. Id. at 2247 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“The irony of all this is that the majority’s decision
may very well discourage generics from challenging pharmaceutical patents in the first place . . . .
Taking the prospect of settlements off the table—or limiting settlements to an earlier entry date
for the generic, which may still be many years in the future—puts a damper on the generic’s
expected value going into litigation, and decreases its incentives to sue in the first place.”).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A) (2012). An additional six months of exclusivity is available for
the reference innovative biologic if pediatric study requirements are met. Id. § 262 (m)(2). The
innovator cannot extend the exclusivity period by making minor changes to its product and filing
a supplemental or subsequent application. See id. § 262(k)(7)(C) (listing modifications for which
the exclusivity period does not apply).
99. Id. § 262(i)(2).
100. Id. § 262(i)(3).
101. Id. § 262(k)(6). Exclusivity extends until the earliest of: one year after the first
commercial marketing of the first-approved interchangeable biosimilar; eighteen months after a
final court decision or the dismissal of a patent infringement suit against the first interchangeable
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set of patent-related provisions that require private information
exchanges among the biosimilar applicant, the reference product
sponsor, and patent holders.102
A. Defining Similarity and Interchangeability
The BPCIA gives the FDA broad discretion to determine
biosimilarity and interchangeability. Evidence to support
biosimilarity may include analytical, animal-based, and clinical
studies, but the FDA may waive the need for these data in any given
case.103 The FDA has authority to designate a biosimilar
interchangeable if it finds that the biosimilar “can be expected to
produce the same clinical result as the reference product in any given
patient,” and repeated administration of the drug will not reduce its
efficacy or increase its toxicity beyond what is expected from the
reference biologic.104
The agency faces a daunting task in making these
determinations because biologics typically are more complex
molecules than small-molecule chemical drugs. They are produced
using biological processes rather than chemical syntheses, which
means that small manufacturing deviations can significantly alter a
product’s safety and efficacy.105 While generic small-molecule drugs
sometimes manifest unexpected clinical effects,106 biosimilars
present an exceedingly more complicated set of scientific
considerations.107 One particular danger that may result from subtle
differences between seemingly interchangeable biologics is increased
immunogenicity, which occurs when a patient’s immune system

biosimilar; forty-two months after the approval of the first interchangeable biologic if patent
litigation is still ongoing; or eighteen months after the approval of the first interchangeable
biosimilar if the applicant has not been sued. Id.
102. Id. § 262(l).
103. Id. § 262(k)(2)(A).
104. Id. U.S.C. § 262(k)(4)(A).
105. Henry Grabowski et al., The Market for Follow-on Biologics: How Will it Evolve?, 25
HEALTH AFFS. 1291, 1291–1301 (2006).
106. See supra Part II.A.
107. Assessing the Impact of a Safe and Equitable Biosimilar Policy in the United States:
Hearing Before the H. Subcommittee on Health and H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 110th
Cong. 22 (2007) (statement of Janet Woodcock, M.D., Deputy Comm’r, Chief Medical Officer,
FDA), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm154017.htm (noting that the
idea of sameness used in the generic small-molecule approval process usually will not be
appropriate in the biologics context).
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develops antibodies to protein-based drugs.108
The FDA’s limited experience reviewing the safety and efficacy
of follow-on protein products presages the issues that it will face
under the BPCIA. Section 505(b)(2) of the FDCA permits an
applicant to file a new drug application that relies on clinical
investigations that were not sponsored by the applicant and for which
the applicant lacks a right of reference or use.109 This provision
authorizes streamlined review of products that do not meet the
sameness requirements for generic drug approval and thus cannot be
approved through the ANDA pathway.110 The FDA has used the
section 505(b)(2) provision to approve some second-generation
biologics, including recombinant versions of human growth hormone
and the enzyme hyaluronidase.111 In these cases, the agency required
the applicant to generate its own clinical data in addition to relying
on publicly available information.112 Notably, while the FDA has
approved several follow-on protein products, the agency has never
found one to be therapeutically equivalent to (and thus substitutable
with) a reference product.113
The amount of evidence that the FDA requires to establish
similarity and interchangeability will dictate the contours of the
biosimilars market.114 These determinations implicate inevitable
cost-quality tradeoffs. The more robust the data to support safety and
efficacy, the more confidence patients, physicians, and payers will
108. Trevor Woodage, Blinded by (a Lack of) Science: Limitations in Determining
Therapeutic Equivalence of Follow-On Biologics and Barriers to Their Approval and
Commercialization, 9 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2012); see also Robert N. Sahr, The Biologics
Price Competition and Innovation Act: Innovation Must Come Before Price Competition, B.C.
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F., 2009, at 3 (describing how a biosimilar erythropoietin drug sold in
Europe triggered an unexpected immune response in patients that exacerbated their preexisting
anemia).
109. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(2012).
110. Krista Hessler Carver et al., An Unofficial Legislative History of the Biologics Price
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671, 679 (2010).
111. Assessing the Impact of a Safe and Equitable Biosimilar Policy in the United States:
Hearing Before the H. Subcommittee on Health and H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, supra
note 107. The FDA used the ANDA provisions to approve a generic version of the hormone
Pergonal in 1997. Carver et al., supra note 110, at 685–86. Although this approval withstood a
legal challenge when the D.C. Circuit deferred to the FDA’s decision, the agency has not since
approved an ANDA for a therapeutic protein product. Id. at 686.
112. Assessing the Impact of a Safe and Equitable Biosimilar Policy in the United States:
Hearing Before the H. Subcommittee on Health and H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, supra
note 107.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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have in biosimilar drugs and the wider their adoption will be.115 But
data generation is expensive, and if the bar for approval is set high,
the envisioned cost savings from a biosimilars market will fail to
materialize.116
Undoubtedly, biosimilars producers will face much higher
start-up and manufacturing costs than generic drug companies.117
Firms may be unwilling or unable to obtain interchangeability status,
given current uncertainty about applicable standards and the
feasibility of achieving them.118 If a biosimilar is not deemed
interchangeable, its manufacturer will need to advertise to promote
its use, which will further drive up costs and prices.119 In sum,
scientific and regulatory complexity will likely prevent biosimilars
from causing the same downward price pressure on the biologics
market that generic drugs exerted on the pharmaceuticals market
following Hatch-Waxman’s passage. The amount of price
competition that does result will be a function of the FDA’s
willingness to permit the free exchange of related, but not identical
biologics.120
B. Interplay Between Federal and State Regulation
Along with federal regulators, state lawmakers face cost and
safety tradeoffs in considering the substitutability of biosimilars.121
Existing state statutes regulating generic drug substitution are

115. Grabowski et al., supra note 9, at 517.
116. See id. at 522 (citing cost estimates for developing complex biosimilars of $100 to $150
million, compared to $1 to $2 million for completing bioequivalence studies for generic drugs);
Jason Kanter & Robin Feldman, Understanding and Incentivizing Biosimilars, 64 HASTINGS L.J.
57, 80 (2012) (noting that empirical data on the impact of generic entry on drug prices suggests
that consumers will not obtain significant cost savings unless multiple biosimilars are developed
to compete with the same brand name biologic).
117. Grabowski et al., supra note 9, at 538–39.
118. In 2005, the European Union passed legislation that adopted the concept of a “similar
biological medicinal product.” What You Need to Know About Biosimilar Medicinal Products,
European Commission, (2013), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/healthcare
/files/docs/biosimilars_report_en.pdf. Each member country may set its own rules regarding
substitution of biosimilars. Currently no country authorizes the substitution of biologics made by
different manufacturers and some EU Member States have expressly banned this practice.
Possibility of Substitution of Biosimilars in Europe, GENERICS AND BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE
(June 14, 2013), http://gabionline.net/reports/possibility-of-substitution-of-biosimilars-in-Europe.
119. Richardson, supra note 8, at 4.
120. See generally id. (discussing the interchangeability of biosimilars and how that will
affect pricing).
121. Kanter & Feldman, supra note 116, 73–74.
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inapplicable to biosimilars.122 For example, section 4073 of the
California Business and Professions Code permits substitution of
drugs with the “same active chemical ingredients,” a restrictive
standard that interchangeable biosimilars will be unable to meet.123
In anticipation of FDA guidance on interchangeability standards,
several states are considering legislation governing biosimilar
substitution.124 Pioneers, follow-on developers, pharmacist
associations, health insurers, and other interested parties are intensely
lobbying state officials on proposed legislation.125 The principal
contested issue is whether pharmacists will be required to notify
patients and prescribing physicians before substituting a pioneer’s
biologic with an interchangeable biosimilar.126
In contrast to existing generic drug substitution laws, most of the
draft bills require physician notification when a pharmacist
substitutes a brand name biologic with an interchangeable
biosimilar.127 As of October 2013, only five such bills had passed,
and none had been signed into law.128 Three of the bills include
sunset provisions that are likely to expire before the FDA approves
the first biosimilar.129 California Governor Jerry Brown vetoed a bill
that would have required prescriber notification of biosimilar
substitution, concluding that it was premature to enact state
legislation before the FDA established interchangeability
standards.130 The state-level battle between pioneers and biosimilars
firms will likely escalate as the FDA specifies the hurdles that must
be cleared to attain interchangeable status.
Additional contentious issues relate to the identification and
labeling of biosimilars.131 A key unresolved question is whether
122. Id. at 74.
123. Id. at 74 (explaining why state generic substitution laws must be adapted for biosimilars).
124. Richardson, supra note 8, at 4.
125. See id.
126. Kurt R. Karst, The Biosimilars State Legislation Scorecard, FDA LAW BLOG
(Sep. 4, 2013), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2013/09/biosimilars
-state-legislation-scorecard.html.
127. Richardson, supra note 8, at 4.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Letter from Edmund G. Brown Jr., Cal. State Governor, to the Members of the California
State Senate (Oct. 12, 2013), available at http://www.gphaonline.org/media/cms/SB_598_2013
_Veto_Message.pdf.
131. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DOCKET NO.
FDA-2010-N-0477, APPROVAL PATHWAY FOR BIOSIMILAR AND INTERCHANGEABLE
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interchangeable biosimilars, like generic drugs, will receive the same
official (i.e., non-trademarked) name as their reference products.
Pioneer firms have argued that interchangeable biosimilars should
have unique names, which would enhance patient safety by
facilitating adverse event monitoring.132 Biosimilar firms and
pharmacist associations counter that unique names could lead to
duplicative prescribing of highly similar products and would create
unnecessary consumer and prescriber confusion.133
A bipartisan group of U.S. Senators recently sent a letter to the
FDA noting: “In crafting the BPCIA, the intent of Congress was to
create a safe and competitive marketplace for biosimilars, akin to the
marketplace for generic drugs.”134 The letter expressed concern that
requiring different names for biosimilars would undermine that goal
by discouraging substitution and inflating healthcare costs.135 Yet,
the FDA must strike a delicate balance between fostering
competition between comparable biologics and ensuring that
patients, physicians, and payers have clear and accurate information
that enables them to make informed choices. Patient safety concerns
might dictate unique names and distinctive labeling for some
biosimilars.
The FDA faces additional policy decisions regarding the
regulation of risk information acquired after biosimilars enter the
market. The BPCIA states that biosimilars manufacturers must
comply with FDA post-market requirements.136 But it remains to be
seen how the FDA will formulate risk evaluation and mitigation
strategies for biosimilars. If the agency treats biosimilars like generic

BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS; PUBLIC HEARING; REQUEST FOR COMMENTS 64–101 (2010) (noting the
need to distinguish among the reference product, related biological products that have not been
shown to be biosimilar, biosimilar products, and interchangeable products).
132. Richardson, supra note 8, at 4.
133. Id. The Generic Pharmaceutical Association recently filed a citizen’s petition with the
FDA requesting that all biosimilars approved by the FDA use the international non-proprietary
name (INN) of their reference products because by definition biosimilars have no clinically
meaningful differences. Generic Industry Calls on FDA to Uphold Consistent, Proven
International Standard for Biosimilar Naming, GENERIC PHARM. ASS’N (Sept. 19, 2013),
http://www.gphaonline.org/gpha-media/press/generic-industry-calls-on-fda-to-uphold-consistent
-proven-international-standard-for-biosimilar-naming.
134. Ed Silverman, Senators to FDA: Has Biosimilar Naming Policy Changed?,
(Oct. 23, 2013),
http://www.pharmalive.com/senators-to-fda-has-biosimliarPHARMALIVE
naming-policy-changed.
135. Id.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(2)(D).
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drugs and stresses the need for sameness between innovative and
follow-on biologics with respect to both product composition and
labeling, the agency may be reluctant to impose individualized
requirements on biosimilars manufacturers. On the other hand, real
differences among brand name and follow-on protein products might
compel a more tailored regulatory approach. The more particularized
the regulation of biosimilars firms, the farther the industry will stray
from a “generic” market for biologics.
Federal labeling requirements will determine the viability of
products liability claims against biosimilar manufacturers. If the
FDA permits biosimilar producers to unilaterally change their labels
in response to risk information discovered after market approval,
then federal law would not preempt state tort claims.137 However, if
the FDA compels biosimilars firms to maintain warnings that are
identical to those of interchangeable brand name biologics, then
impossibility preemption presumably would foreclose failure-towarn claims.138 Patients who take biosimilars would enjoy lower
up-front costs but at the risk of uncompensated harm.139
C. Balancing Competition and Innovation
Hatch-Waxman’s unintended effects on competition and
innovation highlight potential pitfalls that could emerge under the
biosimilars regime.140 Unlike generic drug firms, the first biosimilar
manufacturer to successfully challenge an innovator’s patent does
not receive a 180-day exclusivity period.141 Hence, we may not see
the same type of pay-for-delay settlements that arose in response to
Hatch-Waxman. However, the first biosimilar deemed to be
interchangeable with a reference product enjoys a period of
exclusivity whose length depends on when the biosimilar enters the
market and whether the biosimilar manufacturer is sued for patent
infringement.142 In addition, biosimilars applicants must disclose
137. See supra Part II.B.
138. Id.
139. See Morris, supra note 58, at 281 (discussing how generic drugs are cheaper than the
name brand drug).
140. See supra Part II.
141. Grabowski et al., supra note 9, at 515.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(6) (2012). Exclusivity extends until the earliest of: one year after the
first commercial marketing of the first-approved interchangeable biosimilar; eighteen months
after a final court decision or the dismissal of a suit against the first interchangeable biosimilar;
forty-two months after the approval of the first interchangeable biologic if patent litigation is still
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confidential information to reference product sponsors and patent
holders for the purpose of identifying patent infringement claims and
anticipating litigation.143 These BPCIA provisions create
opportunities for strategic behavior among pioneers and follow-on
developers.
Under the BPCIA, a biosimilar application can be filed four
years after the license date of the reference product.144 The filing of a
biosimilar application triggers a series of mandatory information
exchanges between the biosimilar applicant, the reference product
sponsor, and patent holders.145 Like an ANDA, the submission of a
biosimilar application constitutes an artificial act of infringement on
any patent covering the reference product.146 Since the BPCIA does
not contemplate the creation of an Orange Book for biologics, the
parties must cooperate to identify whether a patent infringement
claim could reasonably be asserted against the biosimilar
applicant.147 This requires the applicant to disclose confidential
information to both the reference product sponsor and the owner of a
patent exclusively licensed to the reference product sponsor.148 The
pioneer receives the benefit of the ability to litigate patent
infringement issues before biosimilar market entry in exchange for
the losses it incurs from the biosimilar applicant’s use of its safety
and potency data.149
Since biosimilars will differ somewhat from their brand name
counterparts, follow-on developers may be able to circumvent
pioneers’ patents.150 Pioneer firms have noted that patent protection
ongoing; or eighteen months after the approval of the first interchangeable biosimilar if the
applicant has not been sued. Id.
143. Id. § 262(l)(1).
144. Id. § 262(k)(7)(B).
145. Id. § 262(l).
146. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(C) (2012).
147. See id. § 262(l)(7)(B) (2012).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(7)(B) (2012).
149. Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets and Patents under
the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 285, 319
(2011) (“The two parts of the statute (i.e., those provisions allowing the biosimilar applicant to
rely on FDA’s prior finding of safety, purity, and potency for the reference product and those
provisions allowing the pioneer to enforce its patents prior to biosimilar market entry) are
dependent on each other. Both are essential pieces of an elaborate statutory bargain.”).
150. Bruce S. Manheim, Jr. et al., ‘Follow-On Biologics’: Ensuring Continued Innovation in
the Biotechnology Industry, 25 HEALTH AFFS. 394, 398–400 (2006) (noting that biologics patents
are often narrower in scope than those covering small-molecule drugs and thus at greater risk of
being successfully challenged or evaded).
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is narrower for biologics than for pharmaceuticals, which enables
imitators to more easily design around biologic patents.151 Hence,
biosimilars manufacturers might have even more success than
generic drug companies establishing that their products, though
similar enough to piggy-back on FDA approval of the pioneer’s
product, are different enough to avoid patent infringement.152 Such
efforts to produce follow-on biologics that circumvent pioneers’
patent claims yet receive the benefits of abbreviated FDA review,
could exacerbate patient safety concerns.
The twelve-year data-exclusivity period for novel biologics may
partly insure pioneer manufacturers against the risk that their patents
fail to ward off follow-on competition.153 But if FDA-administered
exclusivities prove to be insufficient incentives,154 pioneer biologics
manufacturers will be spurred to ramp up patent evergreening
strategies in the same way that small-molecule pharmaceutical
manufacturers responded to the competitive threats created by
Hatch-Waxman.155 This may lead to an increase in sequential
biologics patents, which could be a drag on innovation.156
A biosimilar manufacturer seeking to avoid a pioneer’s
twelve-year exclusivity period or wary of the information-forcing
provisions of the BPCIA may prefer to file a full biologics license
application (BLA) rather than pursue the streamlined approval
pathway.157 If the biosimilar manufacturer takes this approach, it
151. See BIOTECH. INDUS. ORG., A FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS REGIME WITHOUT STRONG
DATA EXCLUSIVITY WILL STIFLE THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW MEDICINES 2–3 (2007), available
at http://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/FOBSData_exclusivity_20070926_0.pdf.
152. See Manheim et al., supra note 150, at 401; Vincent J. Roth, Will FDA Data Exclusivity
Make Biologic Patents Passe?, 29 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 249, 276 (2012)
(noting the “sweet spot” in which “a biologic is similar enough for accelerated approval, but not
identical for purposes of patent infringement”).
153. Grabowski et al., supra note 9, at 551. See also Roth, supra note 152, at 252 (arguing
that the BPCIA did not create new data exclusivity protection, but rather shortened what had been
“continuous data exclusivity” to twelve years).
154. Henry Grabowski, Follow-on Biologics: Data Exclusivity and the Balance Between
Innovation and Competition, 7 NAT. REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 479, 486 (2008) (concluding that a
representative portfolio of new biologic candidates would be expected to recoup R&D costs
between 12.9 and 16.2 years after launch). But see FED. TRADE COMM’N, EMERGING HEALTH
CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC DRUG COMPETITION iii–vi (2009), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/os/2009/06/P083901biologicsreport.pdf (asserting that patents and early-mover
competitive advantages should be sufficient incentives to encourage biologic innovation).
155. See supra Part II.B.
156. See Grabowski, supra note 9, at 551.
157. See Sandoz Will Steer Clear of U.S. Biosimilars Pathway, Use Other Applications, PINK
SHEET, May 3, 2010, available at http://www.pharmamedtechbi.com/publications/the-pink-sheet

PRECAUTIONS FOR BIOSIMILARS

2014]

PRECAUTIONS FOR BIOSIMILARS

11/8/2014 10:07 AM

941

cannot rely on the FDA’s prior approval of the pioneer’s biologic
and must generate its own data demonstrating its product’s safety,
purity, and potency.158 But commentators have expressed concern
that the FDA will enable biosimilars firms to enjoy the best of both
worlds by approving “skinny BLAs.”159 The worry is that the FDA
will accept a follow-on developer’s application as a traditional BLA,
even though the application lacks comprehensive clinical data and
more closely resembles an abbreviated biosimilar application.160
While not admitting it, the FDA could rely on its prior finding that
the pioneer’s biologic is safe, pure, and potent and allow the
biosimilar applicant to market its product immediately, without the
restraints delineated in the BPCIA.161 Such practice would raise
constitutional concerns, as arguably it would amount to a taking of
the pioneer’s trade secrets without compensation.162 It also could
upset the BPCIA’s designed balance between competition and
innovation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Though the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted thirty years ago,
several latent side effects have recently surfaced. These
complications highlight unresolved tensions between the goals of
promoting innovation, ensuring pharmaceutical quality, and
stabilizing healthcare costs. Hatch-Waxman’s focus on premarket
drug approval left unanswered questions about the regulation of risks
that arise after generics enter the market. In addition, its drafters
failed to fully anticipate the complex set of incentives created by the
Act’s patent and exclusivity provisions. Hatch-Waxman’s
unintended consequences serve as precautionary guideposts for
implementation of a biosimilars regulatory approval pathway. The
FDA and lawmakers should heed these potential pitfalls and
proactively confront unavoidable tradeoffs between safety, cost, and
access to therapeutic biologics.
/72/018/sandoz-will-steer-clear-of-us-biosimilars-pathway-use-other-applications (reporting that
some companies have indicated that they will opt not to use the biosimilars pathway in order to
avoid the BPCIA’s information-sharing provisions).
158. Epstein, supra note 149, at 325.
159. Id. at 325–26.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 326.
162. Id. at 326–27.
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